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UNDERPERFORMING POLICY NETWORKS: THE BIOPESTICIDES 
NETWORK IN THE UK 
i
 
 
Abstract    
 
Loosely integrated and incomplete policy networks have been neglected in the 
literature.  They are important to consider in terms of understanding network 
underperformance. The effective delivery and formulation of policy requires 
networks that are not incomplete or underperforming. The biopesticides 
policy network in the UK is considered and its components identified with an 
emphasis on the lack of integration of retailers and environmental groups. The 
nature of the network constrains the actions of its agents and frustrates the 
achievement of policy goals. A study of this relatively immature policy 
network also allows for a focus on network formation. The state, via an 
external central government department, has been a key factor in the 
development of the network. Therefore, it is important to incorporate such 
factors more systematically into understandings of network formation. 
Feedback efforts from policy have increased interactions between 
productionist actors but the sphere of consumption remains insufficiently 
articulated.    
 
Keywords: policy networks; regulation; governance; implementation; 
pesticides; sustainability  
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Extensive research and analysis has taken place on policy communities and 
policy networks. There is a substantial British literature (e.g Richardson and 
Jordan, 1979, Rhodes, 1986, Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, Marsh, 1998a). Some 
writers have moved onto other frameworks, for example advocacy coalitions 
(Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993), or group capacity (Daugbjerg and Halpin, 
2008).  Whilst not discounting such approaches, our view is that policy 
network analysis remains of considerable utility in political science. A great 
deal of innovative writing and research is still taking place within the 
paradigm (For example, Botterill 2005,  Parker 2007, Greenaway et al, 2007, 
Hindmoor 2009). It has been central to the literature on governance, which is 
often described as rule by and through networks (Bevir and Richards, 2009).    
 
Research on policy networks and communities has tended to 
emphasize relatively stable policy communities, or at least relatively well 
integrated and functioning networks.  As Hay observes, „network failure [is] 
almost wholly absent from the existing literature‟ (1998, 49).  There is a need 
to study loose and incomplete policy networks, if only to examine instances of 
underperformance where the potential of a network is not fulfilled. The 
literature distinguishes between tightly integrated policy communities which 
are closed to outside groups and have a limited membership, and issue 
networks which are loosely integrated, open to outsiders and have a broader 
membership. There is a risk of oversimplification; not all networks will fit 
these categorisations (a point acknowledged by writers such as Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992b, 250, and Smith, 1993, 65).  Moreover, what is meant by terms 
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such as „limited‟ and „broader‟ and where is the cut off point?  In this article 
we introduce a category of „incomplete networks‟ to indicate where not 
enough of the relevant actors are involved in a policy network, and outline 
how this differs from an issue network.   
 
The biopesticides policy network in the UK is ideal for focusing on 
these issues. The network is relatively immature and weakly developed 
compared to others analysed in political science and often lacks political 
sophistication. The network has something of a „hub and spoke‟ character 
with its core provided by a regulatory agency, the Chemical Regulation 
Directorate (CRD), which is constrained by its role in the initiatives it can 
take.  CRD was formed on 1
st
 April 2009, integrating the existing functions of 
the Pesticide Safety Directorate (PSD), the Chemical Schemes Assessment 
Unit of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), and elements of human 
exposure and socio-economic assessment into a single regulatory unit. The 
case study is interesting, in part given the regulatory innovation that has 
occurred within the agency. It is an unusual step for a body which usually has 
to stick closely to what is laid down in statute to negotiate new policy spaces 
in which to operate which is essentially what has happened here (see Greaves, 
2009).  
 
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, we draw out the relevant 
points from the literature on policy networks, distinguishing between 
networks as interest intermediation and networks as governance. Secondly, we 
outline the potential participants in the biopesticides network, introducing our 
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themes of „incomplete networks‟ and „network underperformance‟. Thirdly, 
we outline the role of the Pesticides Forum as a compositional measure of the 
network.  Fourthly, we outline the components of the network in more detail 
and from this draw our conclusions. The paper draws on fifty semi structured 
interviews with a range of actors in the network. 
 
Different Network Approaches  
 
The term „policy network‟ is used in many different ways (see Rhodes, 2006). 
Rhodes (2006, 426) offers the following definition: 
  
Policy networks are sets of formal institutional and informal linkages 
between governmental and other actors structured around shared if 
endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy making and 
implementation. These actors are interdependent and policy emerges 
from the interactions between them  
 
Rhodes accepts there could be many qualifications to this definition but it is a 
helpful starting point. We can, as Borzel (1998) and Bevir and Richards 
(2009) suggest, further distinguish between approaches that treat networks as 
interest intermediation and those which treat networks as governance.  Both 
approaches are relevant to our discussion; indeed governance revises rather 
than replaces the model of policy networks and in many ways increases its 
importance (see Rhodes, 1997).   
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Policy Networks as Interest Intermediation 
 
Policy network analysis focuses on the importance of organizational rather 
than personal relationships and often looks at whether there is continuity in 
the interactions of interest groups and government departments. These 
interactions constitute a process of interest intermediation (Bevir and 
Richards, 2009, 4).  Recent work by Botterill (2005) and Hindmoor (2009) 
uses policy networks in this sense.  The modern state has a crucial role in 
economic and social life. To intervene in these areas, government needs 
resources not available within the state apparatus (Kenis and Schneider, 1991, 
41).  Typically it will become dependent upon organized interests which have 
resources within specific policy areas (Daugbjerg, 1998, 21).   Rhodes in his 
pre-governance work argued that it is ultimately government that calls the 
shots. „The relationship is asymmetric‟, it is government which creates the 
network, creates access to the network and the rules of the game (Rhodes, 
1988, 82). Networks are portrayed as sets of interdependent organizations 
which need to exchange resources in order to achieve their goals (Rhodes and 
Marsh, 1992, 10-11). This feeds into typologies and lists of the characteristics 
of policy networks and policy communities which suggest policy networks 
vary along a continuum according to the closeness of the relationships in 
them.   
 
We can usefully consider Rhodes and Marsh typology (1992, 251), as 
adapted by Daugbjerg  (1998, 44).  Daugbjerg presents policy communities 
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and issue networks as two extreme network types on a continuum. His three 
dimensions are: membership, integration and institutionalism. Policy 
communities have a very limited number of members with a narrow range of 
interests represented.  Issue networks, on the other hand, have a large number 
of members and a wide range of interests. Integration defines the form, quality 
and frequency of interaction within the network. „Members of policy 
communities are highly integrated in governmental policy making whereas 
members of issue networks are only loosely integrated‟ (1998, 42).  
Integration ranges from bargaining and negotiation in policy communities to 
consultations in issue networks.  Interaction also varies in frequency. Contacts 
are frequent and relate to all matters in policy communities, in issue networks 
the pattern of interaction is unstable.  Who needs who varies from issue to 
issue and from one question to another. An interest group will only be 
consulted if it has resources relevant to the specific question on the agenda; in 
other cases, it will be marginalized. Finally, the degree of institutionalism can 
be defined by the extent to which there is consensus on the principles to 
underpin policy choices and on the procedures with which to approach policy 
problems.  In other words, such consensus will exist in policy communities 
but there will be conflict in issue networks.  
 
Daugbjerg adds that a policy network often has a core and a periphery, 
again reflecting a point made by Marsh and Rhodes (1992b, 255).  The core 
consists of actors continuously involved in the policy process, whilst members 
of the periphery are consulted only on specific issues in which they have 
particular resources. Within a policy network there is a distinction between 
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members with resources and influences and those without. In essence the 
literature implies „either that members of a policy network have unequal 
resources or that some interests are outside the network but, on occasion, are 
consulted or that the boundaries of any network are permeable‟(Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992b, 256).  This raises the issue of „incomplete networks‟. (Pross 
1986, 99), for example, refers to the „attentive publics‟ of policy networks, a 
phrase which draws attention to the range of possible actors but does not treat 
them as members of the network.  
 
  Hindmoor (2009, 80) asks why governments form policy 
communities with some groups but not with others?  He suggests that 
government will work most closely with those groups which have valuable 
resources; a point made in a different way by Daugbjerg (1998, 22) who 
argues that „perhaps the most important reason why some actors are excluded 
from a network is that they lack [such] resources‟. No organization willingly 
includes others (Daaugbjerg, 1998, 22).  As Rhodes puts it (1981, 122), 
„organisations are....primarily concerned to avoid each other‟.  In a policy 
community there is a sense in which some groups are „consciously excluded‟ 
(Bevir and Richards, 2009, 4).  Heclo (1978), in a landmark study, played 
down the restricted nature of access to policy making and was the first to 
conceptualize the idea of relatively open „issue networks‟ with a wider array 
of participants as having replaced closed circles of control. As Daugbjerg puts 
it (1998, 50), „access to an issue network is relatively open‟ but he adds that 
there are some restrictions such as actors must have „legitimate‟ interests in 
the issues addressed.    
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Marsh (1998b) interprets Dowding as arguing that network structures 
per se have no influence on policy outcomes. Rather, networks reflect patterns 
of interaction and resource exchange between agents and it is these which 
determine outcomes: „the explanation lies in the characteristics of the actors‟ 
(Dowding, 1995, 142).  Dowding, however, denies giving primacy to agents 
not structures, arguing that network analysis can produce genuine structural 
explanations (Dowding, 2001, 100-1). The importance of structures is 
particularly clear when considering very loose and incomplete networks. 
Unless there is a regularized framework for interaction which includes 
agreement on the rules of the game and broad objectives, it is difficult to see 
how effective bargaining that resolves conflicts and produces solutions can 
occur.  We advocate, in a sense, a dialectical approach as put forward by 
Marsh (1998c) and Marsh and Smith (2000). This suggests that networks are 
structures which can constrain or facilitate action but do not determine actions 
because actors interpret and negotiate contracts. Not only do networks affect 
policy outcomes, but policy outcomes feed-back and affect networks.   
 
Policy Networks as Governance 
 
A theme in modern public administration is the shift from government to 
governance. There has been a shift from government by the unitary state 
towards governance by and through a range of networks of various kinds (eg: 
Rhodes, 1997; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003). As Greenaway et al put it (2007, 
717-18), „network approaches have provided useful insights into the issue of 
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policy implementation. They stress the importance of exchange of resources, 
the non-hierarchical interaction of actors and institutions, and interdependence 
in a world of bargaining and complexity‟. There are many different definitions 
of governance (see Rhodes, 1997, 46-52). Rhodes has defined it in terms of 
„self-organizing, inter-organizational networks‟ (Rhodes, 2000, 346), and 
points to four key characteristics. The first of these is „Interdependence 
between organizations.   Governance is broader than government, covering 
non-state actors.‟ The changed boundaries of the state mean that the 
boundaries between public, private and voluntary sectors become shifting and 
opaque.  Second, there are „Continuing interactions between network 
members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared 
purposes.‟   In other words, governance requires the existence of policy 
networks that operate effectively.    Third, there are „Game-like interactions, 
rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by 
network participants.‟    Fourth, there is „A significant degree of autonomy 
from the state.  Networks are not accountable to the state: they are self-
organizing.‟ The state does not occupy a sovereign position, but it can 
indirectly and imperfectly steer networks (Rhodes, 2000, 346). The Rhodes 
formulation makes clear that policy networks facilitate negotiation and the 
development of shared understandings among participants. We can infer that 
in order to function properly, policy networks must be constitutive of all 
relevant policy-makers   
 
The traditional policy network literature was based on central 
departments or parts of them.   Rhodes, therefore, revises the policy network 
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concept to reflect the shift to governance (Rhodes, 2000, 348).  Firstly, the 
membership of networks has become broader, incorporating both the private 
and voluntary sectors. Secondly, the government has swapped direct for 
indirect controls.  For example, it removed operational management from 
central departments and vested it in separate agencies (see Rhodes, 1997, ch 
5-7).   Fragmentation not only created new networks but increased the 
membership of existing ones. Central departments are no longer necessarily 
the fulcrum, or focal organization, of a network.  Rhodes uses the term 
„network‟ to describe the „various interdependent actors involved in delivering 
services‟ (1997, 51).  As British government creates agencies and uses 
special-purpose bodies to deliver services, networks become increasingly 
prominent among British governing structures (1997, 51). As networks 
multiply, so do doubts about the centre‟s capacity to steer (Rhodes, 1997, 54).  
Rhodes emphasis on „policy delivery‟ may indicate another shift from the 
traditional literature. That being said, he notes that the importance of 
(traditional) policy networks varied with the stage of the policy process 
(Rhodes, 1997, 12). Marsh and Rhodes, for example, stressed its relevance for 
analysing policy implementation (see 1992b, 185-6); as does Smith (1993) 
who argues that tighter policy communities increase the capabilities of the 
state to make and implement policy 
 
Parker (2007), in a particularly helpful article, suggests that in order 
for networks to be regarded as a form of governance they must play a role in 
steering, setting directions and influencing behaviour.  The characteristics 
necessary for these objectives to be achieved are density, breadth and 
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association with values such as trust, mutuality and identity.  A dense network 
is one in which all group members are connected to each other. Density 
ensures that there are no gaps in the network that might result in a critical 
break in information sharing, communication and negotiation.  Networks also 
require breadth in the sense that they incorporate the range of actors and 
institutions whose activities impact on governance outcomes. As Parker puts it 
(2007, p. 119), „without density and breadth, networks would be unable to 
influence behaviour and set directions for the range of actors involved in a 
particular policy problem and would therefore be unable to satisfy governance 
outcomes‟.  This can be seen as updating some of the traditional thinking of 
policy networks in terms of membership and integration. Finally, trust, 
mutuality and common identity are critical if networks are to perform a 
coordinating function in steering and shaping behaviour (see Keast et al, 2005, 
364).   
 
The Biopesticides Policy Network 
 
Biopesticides are made up of a broad group of agents. They are defined here 
as mass produced, biologically based agents used for the control of plant 
pests. This definition includes not only the active ingredient of a biopesticide 
but also the way it is used.  The management of plant pests is heavily reliant 
on synthetic chemical pesticides. Problems of natural resistance and the 
withdrawal of products for regulatory and commercial reasons mean that there 
are fewer chemical pesticides available on the market. This is a particular 
problem for speciality crops in the horticulture sector that are grown on 
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relatively small acreages, e.g., courgettes, cauliflowers and are, therefore, not 
attractive in terms of the commercial development of new products.   Many of 
these so-called minor crops are dependent on one, relatively old product 
which may not work with all soil types.   Biopesticides have an important role 
to play in crop protection but usually in combination with other methods such 
as chemical pesticides as part of Integrated Pest Management (IPM). They 
tend to be less toxic than chemical pesticides, have little or no residue and are 
often very specific.   
 
It is helpful at this point to summarize the main network players.  
Essentially one can identify the following potential participants:   
 
1: The regulatory agency (which forms the hub of the policy network).  
2: Growers (and their representative organizations) 
3: The biocontrol manufacturers (and their representative 
organization). 
4: Consultants (who can be important intermediaries). 
5: Environmental non-governmental organizations. 
6: Retailers. 
7: Consumer organizations   
 
The relevant national government department (Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs - Defra) is excluded from this list as 
under governance arrangements, its role should be one of „steering‟ This task 
may not be performed perfectly, but it is expected to be softer, less intrusive 
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and less hierarchical than under traditional systems of government. CRD is 
the agency responsible for regulating microbial agents and naturally occurring 
substances used as plant protection products in the UK. Defra, to which CRD 
reports, has a fairly „hands off‟ relationship with the agency; they may prefer 
to keep themselves distant so that if anything goes wrong CRD will take the 
flak (Greaves, 2009). The minister responsible for pesticides policy, Phil 
Woolas, commented at an open meeting of the Advisory Committee on 
Pesticides (ACP) that, „It‟s an area of public service if it gets in the news, it 
tends to be negative. As an elected politician one wants to keep it out of the 
news. It is not an easy area of government policy‟ (12th November, 2007).  
CRD‟s policy advisory work is funded by a grant from Defra, whilst its 
approvals and registration work is undertaken on a cost recovery basis, 
through charges to the firms seeking registration and a levy on approval 
holders. Each year CRD‟s objectives are agreed with government ministers, 
but in common with many government agencies they are given a considerable 
degree of autonomy.  
 
A focus on the organizational relationships between the potential 
participants may suggest similarities with an „issue network‟, as outlined by 
Daugbjerg (1998).  There is a lack of integration, in terms of the form, quality 
and frequency of interaction (although some positive changes are occurring in 
this respect). When it takes place it consists of consultation and is on an ad 
hoc and issue by issue basis. Whilst there is a degree of consensus on goals 
and procedures, they are not shared with important actors‟ such as retailers 
and environmental groups.  Daugbjerg concentrates on „horizontal‟ 
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interactions between „interests‟ and the government department: we may also 
wish to consider vertical interactions between players in the network, which 
are also often weak.  He also focuses on integration into the policy making 
process: in the age of governance we also need to focus on policy 
implementation. Finally, we can define „interests‟ broadly to include not only 
pressure groups but actors such as supermarkets and individuals such as 
consultants.  
 
An Incomplete and Underperforming Network? 
 
The network lacks what Parker (2007) would describe as density and breadth 
(and, therefore, values such as trust, mutuality and identity).  The interactions 
with retailers and environmental groups are so limited they are best described 
as lying outside the network.  Whilst it can be difficult to demarcate the 
boundary of a network, we believe this offers greater clarity than the core 
periphery distinction in the literature. This links to the notion of „incomplete 
networks‟, in a sense building on Pross‟s analysis (1986). This raises the 
methodological question of who determines whether the network is incoherent 
or incomplete. We have extensive materials based on interviews, observation 
and documentary analysis about the operations of the network.  However, the 
researcher cannot determine as a „deus ex machina‟ who should be in the 
network and how it should operate. This can only be done by the participants 
in the network itself as a self-constituting entity.  Respondents did not, of 
course, use the language of network analysis, but they did comment 
extensively on the absence of effective relationships between actors that 
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facilitated policy formulation and implementation.  In particular, regulators 
drew attention to the difficulties that arose from the lack of systematic contact 
with retailers while biopesticide manufacturers regretted their lack of 
engagement with environmental groups.  
 
More „joined up‟ relationships between these actors would facilitate 
the search for policy solutions and their implementation. The debate is not 
simply about the number of actors involved, but whether the right actors are 
involved.  This distinguishes an incomplete from an issue network where 
there are many participants (and membership is fluid) because the barriers of 
entry are very low. In so far as the network has been strengthened, it has been 
in terms of seeking to incorporate biopesticide manufacturers and to 
strengthen links with farmers and growers. In other words, the focus has been 
on the politics of production.   However, contemporary politics is typified by a 
greater emphasis on the politics of consumption.    Consumption choices 
contribute to definitions of personal identity: 
 
The growth of affluence has led to a stress on personal development 
and society is re-orientated towards the values of individuality and 
self-expression. With the decline in the defining power of old 
economic and political forms – associated with workplace, class and 
nation – self-identity has shifted to spheres where individuals have 
discretion and control (Lowe et al, 2008, 228).  
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These choices are structured by retailers who see themselves as proxy 
spokespersons for consumers. The lack of connection of retailers with the 
policy network means that it is lopsided and confined to one sphere of 
politics. To what extent, therefore, does the incomplete nature of a policy 
network lead to network failure or underperformance? As stated at the outset, 
network failure is underplayed in the existing literature. Hay, however, 
provides a helpful analysis, stating that the immediate problem of identifying 
network failure can be captured in the question, „failure for whom?‟ (Hay, 
1998, 49). In other words, failure for one organization, interest or actor may 
constitute or represent success for, and the success of, another. Indeed, the 
(perceived) network success for one organization is not unrelated to its ability 
to seize and hegemonize the „common‟ strategic agenda of the network, in 
turn subverting the collective interest for the particular interest (1998, 49/50).  
Hay takes the analysis a stage further by separating out analytically (i) 
network failure: where the collective strategic agenda is subverted in pursuit 
of a singular agenda; and (ii) network crisis: a situation in which perceptions 
of network failure threaten the very continuity of the network (1998, 50).  We 
add a further category of underperforming networks to account for instances 
where although the potential of the network is not fulfilled there is not total 
network failure.  
 
It is helpful to define network failure (or underperformance) more 
clearly. A failing network may be unable to promote its collective interest. 
This may not be because of subversion in pursuit of a singular agenda; it may 
be because the network is incomplete so that if relevant stakeholders are not 
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consulted policy risks being deficient.  The main focus in this paper, however, 
is on network failure in terms of policy implementation and delivery.  We 
assess policy implementation and delivery in terms of whether the 
government‟s goal of the wider use of biopesticides has been achieved.  A 
fully functioning network would facilitate the new objectives set by the 
European Union (EU) legislation passed in 2009, principally the revision of 
91/414 and the sustainable uses directorate. This places an emphasis on IPM 
and the uses of alternatives to synthetic pesticides.  Member states have to 
demonstrate that they are making progress in that direction and that would be 
more readily achievable with a fully functioning and comprehensive policy 
network.   
 
The Pesticides Forum 
 
We can use membership of the Pesticides Forum as a compositional measure 
for the pesticides policy network in its wider sense, because of its role which 
requires a broad membership but one that also sets boundaries.  Its 
responsibilities include overseeing the work of the Action Groups referred to 
below. The Forum was established in 1996 and its objectives were updated 
towards the end of 2007 to better reflect their role in aiming to develop an 
agreement amongst their stakeholders and supporting the UK Pesticides 
Strategy. Its overall aims are:   
 
 „To continue to oversee work under the UK Pesticides Strategy, 
monitor the effects of policies, laws and other initiatives that affect or 
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are affected by the use of pesticides, and offer advice to Ministers and 
stakeholders as appropriate‟. 
  „To provide a forum for exchanging views, and wherever possible 
allowing our stakeholders (the people who have an interest in our 
work) to come to a general agreement‟ 
(http://www.pesticides.gov.uk/pesticides_forum.asp?id=1318, 
accessed 13 July 2008).  
 
Following expansion in 1998 from its original 16 members, 
membership of the Forum is now drawn from 23 organizations. These cover 
the farming and agrochemical industries, environmental and conservation 
groups, education and training, consumer interests, trade unions and organic 
farming.  Ten Government departments and departmental bodies can attend as 
observers.  The International Biocontrol Manufacturers Association (IBMA) 
is not a member, suggesting that biopesticides manufacturing is not seen as a 
high priority. The Fresh Produce Consortium is represented and its 
membership „covers all areas of the industry spectrum including wholesale, 
food service, importer, packer, retail and floral‟ 
(http://www.freshproduce.org.uk/who_we_are.php, accessed 17
th
 Sept 2008) . 
Retailers, therefore, receive some form of representation (many of the large 
supermarkets are members of the Consortium). However, in this sector 
individual firms are important in their own right; in that sense retailers are not 
properly integrated into the network.  
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The Forum is not a body that any interested party can join.  
Appointments are formally made by Defra Ministers but acting on advice 
from CRD.   This is consistent with Defra delegating as much decision 
making as possible: the Forum is based at York, within the same offices as 
CRD.  Membership is on the basis of invitation, but was intended to reach out 
to a wider range of stakeholders to „trusted consumer and green groups … 
beyond a formerly narrow circle of expert insiders and agribusiness 
consultees.‟  (Hood et al, 2003, 160). At a stakeholder meeting held by Defra, 
one participant commented that the Pesticides Forum „was a bit of a closed 
shop … It would help represent interests better [if there was] a wider range of 
groups.   Some people are allowed on it and some are not.‟  Another 
participant from the forestry sector stated that they had asked if they could be 
represented and were told that the group was full.  Any attempt to formally 
reproduce a policy network always creates difficulties of inclusion or 
exclusion.  CRD‟s response on this occasion was that they were wary of the 
group becoming unwieldy or unbalanced and that non-governmental 
organizations struggled to resource the input.  
 
There has been little discussion of biopesticides within the Forum but 
the topic was discussed at a meeting in the autumn of 2008 leading to a view 
that the availability action plan should give greater attention to „alternatives‟ 
to conventional pesticides such as biopesticides.   This was primarily a 
response to new EU legislation that places greater emphasis on alternatives to 
synthetic pesticides.   Nevertheless, it is the best descriptor of the network we 
have and relevant for finding out whom is in the network in its wider sense. 
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This brings up the question of the relationship between the wider and 
narrower networks. The system of chemical pesticides regulation in the UK 
has developed since the 1940s with pesticide residues in food being monitored 
since the 1950s.   Hence, the actors involved, such as the National Farmers‟ 
Union (NFU), have long experience of interaction with the regulators. 
Biopesticides and their regulation is a more recent development, reflected in 
the immaturity of the network. The networks overlap and some of the actors 
are the same so an actor‟s involvement in the wider network might give it 
access to biopesticide discussions. This access is particularly evident in the 
case of the farmers and growers‟ organizations, whereas IBMA is a recently 
formed organization with no long-term experience of interaction with 
government bodies. 
 
A Sectoral or Sub-Sectoral Network?  
 
This links to the debate on the relative importance of policy networks at sector 
and sub-sector level. There are difficulties in defining a „sector‟ but for our 
purpose we refer to „pesticides‟ as a sector and „biopesticides‟ as a sub-
sector.
ii
 Jordan et al (1994) argue that agricultural policy making in Britain is 
characterized by sub-sectoral policy communities. Cavanagh et al (1995, 627), 
meanwhile, write that only empirical analysis can establish whether sectoral 
or sub-sectoral policy networks are the most important in a policy sector.  
They add, however, that research should „pay more attention to structure, in 
particular to the principles, procedures and norms guiding the policy process 
within sub-sectoral policy communities. These are often set by sectoral policy 
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communities (Cavanagh et al,1995, 627-8).  The sector/sub-sectoral debate 
involves major methodological disagreements which are difficult to resolve 
(see Daugbjerg, 1998, 25-26). Essentially, we share the view of Marsh and 
Rhodes that „the policy network concept can be used at both the sectoral and 
the sub-sectoral level‟ (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992b, 254).  To some extent 
governance moves the debate on: networks will be focusing more on policy 
delivery and the devolution of responsibilities to government agencies could 
result in more networks operating at a more specialized level (see, for 
example, Jordan and Maloney, 1997). In a sense networks can be seen as 
existing at every level (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992b, 254).  
   
Sustainability, Co-operation and Networks 
 
The biopesticides policy network is challenged to promote more sustainable 
alternatives to chemical pesticides. As the national pesticides strategy, 
Pesticides and the Environment: a Strategy for the Sustainable Use of Plant 
Protection Products (2006, 13) puts it, „The Government believes that the 
availability of plant protection products is largely a matter for the market and 
for the crop protection and farming industries.‟ Hence an ability to work 
together effectively in a policy network becomes a key factor determining 
whether environmentally sustainable policies can be delivered.  There are 
many definitions of sustainability, but the Brundtland Commission (1987) 
defined it as „development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs‟ 
(http://www.sustainabilitydictionary.com, accessed 30/01/08).  Although 
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environmental sustainability must have a special emphasis in relation to 
pesticides, other aspects of sustainability should be taken into account, 
including economic sustainability. A key obstacle to promoting sustainability 
is the regulatory process. As Waage puts it, „biopesticide development is 
locked into an inflexible and unimaginative chemical pesticide model. In this 
position, all of the shortcomings of biopesticides relative to chemicals emerge 
and none of the benefits‟ (Waage, 1997, 14).  
 
Pesticides are toxic substances and there needs to be a thorough 
evaluation of their impact. The aim is not to remove or reduce regulation, but 
to reconfigure it so that the benefits of more environmentally friendly 
products can be realized. This requires a learning process for the regulators 
and a willingness to engage with a range of stakeholders. Here policy network 
analysis becomes particularly important. Effective change requires the co-
operation of a wider range of actors. Co-operation is needed to ensure that 
regulation does not discourage innovation in sustainable products by imposing 
onerous requirements that have little relevance to the objectives of regulation 
(e.g. ensuring that a product is safe). This can be achieved by effective 
information exchange that identifies the problems and develops mutually 
acceptable solutions to them.    
 
The national pesticides strategy (2006) is designed to reduce the 
environmental impact of plant protection products in the UK.  This strategy 
encourages „voluntary approaches to deliver results wherever possible.‟  
(2006, 8).   The government‟s view was that „a broad package of voluntary 
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and statutory measures is likely to deliver benefits beyond those achievable 
through regulation alone.‟  (2006, 9)  The strategy outlines high level Action 
Plans to take forward further measures to promote sustainable use.  The 
responsibility for taking forward these Action Plans rests with a series of 
implementation groups compromising key stakeholders. In some cases this 
has led to network formation where actors were not connected before. In the 
case of the Amenity Forum which brings together non-agricultural users of 
pesticides its chair stated that there was „no tradition of co-operation and 
discussion of core issues until its formation‟ (ACP meeting, 12 Nov 2007). 
The important one in terms of biopesticides is the Availability Action Plan 
Group (re-named in 2008 to include the word „Alternatives‟).  This includes 
stakeholders such as the NFU , the Crop Protection Association, and the 
IBMA. The group works, for example, on initiatives designed particularly to 
help maintain sufficient pesticide availability for the production of minor 
crops in the UK where, as we have seen, biopesticides have a role to play.  
 
A better relationship amongst network actors could also encourage 
producers to use the regulatory framework rather than seeking to evade it by 
producing so-called „grey products‟ that then undermine confidence in 
biopesticides because they lack efficacy. Some products, for example, appear 
in forms that lie outside the scope of the pesticide regulations, e.g. as plant 
strengtheners, leaf enhancers etc.  It has been estimated that thirty products are 
sold as bio-stimulants in the UK with the impression being given that they 
have pest control benefits (Availability Action Plan Group Meeting, York, 28 
Nov 2007).   
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Network Components 
 
CRD: the Hub of the Network 
 
Encouraging the wider use of biopesticides has been a policy objective for the 
Labour Government, yet progress towards this goal initially proved painfully 
slow.  It therefore became necessary for the institutions of the core executive 
to intervene in the policy making process. The then Business Regulation 
Team (BRT) of the Regulatory Impact Unit of the Cabinet Office discovered 
in 2002 that, „although Defra has been funding the research and development 
of  “alternatives” to synthetic pesticides, none had been able to obtain the 
authorisation required for such products to be placed for sale in the UK as 
plant protection products‟.  It was observed that PSD‟s testing requirements 
„were evidently designed to cope with standard, mass produced synthetic 
chemical pesticides which, by their nature, tend to deliver very high efficacy 
rates, and not with this group of safer alternatives‟. As far as the Regulatory 
Impact Unit was concerned, this „appeared to us to be an interesting example 
of regulation-inspired market failure‟ (Business Regulation Team, 2003, 19).  
 
In the coded language of the English civil service, „the BRT 
approached PSD seeking to help to establish a workable solution to this 
problem.‟   In other words, they used their authority to lean on PSD.   It was 
reported that PSD „was keen to discuss ways in which the pursuit of this new 
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aim could be promoted.‟   (Business Regulation Team, 2003, 19). That they 
leaned on PSD was confirmed both by a senior figure within the agency and 
by an industrial executive seconded to BRT to work on biopesticides.  CRD‟s 
Director of Approvals commented that „there was a political driver but it 
wasn‟t Defra or growers, it was the Cabinet Office‟ (Biopesticides Workshop, 
31
st
 October 2007). 
iii
  Furthermore, „it was someone on secondment to the 
Cabinet Office, not a career civil servant‟ (Biopesticides Workshop, 31st 
October 2007).  
 
This led in June 2003 to the introduction of a pilot scheme to 
encourage the development and introduction of alternative control measures. 
As the Director of Approvals put it, „we did need some pressure to introduce 
the scheme‟, we were given „a kick in the teeth‟ (REBECA Conference, Sept 
20/21 2007). 
iv
 The scheme included lower registration fees and pre-
submission meetings to encourage and assist applications. A permanent 
Biopesticides Scheme was introduced in June 2006 and this continued with 
pre-submission meetings and reduced fees.  It also introduced a biopesticides 
champion to provide initial contact for product innovators and manufacturers 
and help them through the approval process. It also led to the appointment of 
specialist „bio-contacts‟ to provide guidance on specific scientific and 
regulatory issues. Only four actives were approved between 1985 and 2003. 
Since the introduction of the pilot scheme, six further actives have been 
approved for use in the UK. Seven others are at various stages of evaluation 
and a number of others are under discussion (Dale, 2008).  PSD were told by 
the biopesticide industry that if they reformed the „floodgates would open‟. 
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This has not happened but outcomes have been favourable compared to the 
preceding period. As John Dale from CRD puts it (Dale, 2008), „still not as 
many as we had hoped for, but an encouraging start‟  
 
Intervention from the Cabinet Office was a factor in the formation of 
the policy network.  This can be described as exogenous pressure: CRD after 
all is an agency of Defra, not the Cabinet Office.  Indeed, in accordance with 
governance arrangements the regulatory agency operates at some distance 
from Defra (see Greaves 2009).  There was little interaction, not least between 
IBMA and PSD, before the Cabinet Office intervention. There was little to 
resemble a policy network as commonly understood by the term.  The agency 
had no particular provision for biopesticides, IBMA had only just been 
formed, and the UK Minor Uses Network (of which growers and farmers are 
members) did not meet until the end of April 2003. There were other forms of 
exogenous pressure. Dale refers to negative press and grower concerns over a 
lack of alternative control measures. The agency responded to the various 
pressures by increased communication with the IBMA, growers and others 
(Dale, 2008). A conference on biopesticides held in November 2003 by the 
Horticultural Research International (HRI) Association provided a further 
focus for discontent over the handling of biopesticides, which had been given 
momentum by a report published in that year by ACP on alternatives to 
chemical pesticides  
 
Despite its distance from Defra the agency is constrained in what it 
can do, both in terms of the existing pesticides legislation (both EU and UK) 
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and its mandated aims and objectives.  This could be a factor in preventing 
further network development.  The agency‟s framework document (1996) sets 
out its formal status and accountability. It states that „the aim of PSD is to 
protect the health of human beings, creatures and plants, safeguard the 
environment and secure safe, efficient and humane methods of pest control, 
by controlling the sale, supply, storage, advertisement and use of pesticides‟ 
(http://www.pesticides.gov.uk/corporate.asp?id=232, accessed 9/10/07).  One 
of its aims, as part of the strategy for sustainable food and farming, is to 
reduce the negative impacts of pesticides on the environment. The objectives 
of the organization appear consistent with promoting the wider use of 
biopesticides, but only with further ministerial approval and guidance.  It may 
also not be appropriate for a regulatory agency to promote a particular 
technology. At a practical level the approvals side of CRD is set up with a 
staff of scientists to undertake the task of registration to ensure the safe use of 
pesticides and it is not equipped to take on an advocacy role.  The role of the 
(part-time) Biopesticides Champion is to assist biologicals through the 
registration process and not to be an advocate in any stronger sense.  
Furthermore, as the Director of Approvals put it, „my challenge is to promote 
the scheme, not to promote biopesticides, there is a difference‟ (Biopesticides 
workshop, 21
st
 October 2007).  
 
CRD has devoted considerable resources to stakeholder engagement 
but it was evident from the research that network development initiatives 
could only take place at a relatively high level within the agency.   As one 
consultant put it in interview, „In PSD you need to go up to policy director 
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level to bring about change.‟  Within CRD, network formation is clearly a key 
role for the small Strategy and Stakeholder Engagement Group, but the Policy 
Group also has an important role.  While there are differences of culture 
within CRD, the Director of Approvals Group has been very actively involved 
in network formation and development activities.   He thought that CRD had 
an interesting agenda for a regulatory agency as it could work with 
stakeholders on initiatives.    The challenge had been that „We particularly felt 
that we were not meeting the right stakeholders and they were not hearing us.  
You had to sit back and ask why they are not listening to us.‟ (interview, 8 
December 2005).  One of the reasons was that the policy network was 
incomplete. 
 
Farmers and Growers  
 
A key challenge for farmers and growers is the withdrawal of plant protection 
products as a result of the EU regulatory review process. Following the 
implementation of European Directive 91/414 EEC there has been a 
significant decline in the number of active ingredients permitted for use in 
crop protection products.   This is likely to be accelerated by a revision of 
91/414/EEC which was awaiting Council approval in 2009.   Moreover, 
because of the expense of research and registration, manufacturers are 
unlikely to develop new chemical products on a large scale. This means that 
the production of some crops might become impossible in the UK if there is 
nothing that can be used to deal with infestation.  It is, therefore, not 
surprising that NFU is particularly active within CRD‟s Minor Uses Network 
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which addresses minor use problems and has considered the contribution of 
biological products to filling gaps in availability.    
 
More generally, NFU seems to be relatively well disposed towards the 
agency and recommended in the context of discussions about the 
implementation of the EU‟s REACH regulations that PSD should form the 
core of a new chemicals agency that would enable it to draw on its experience. 
v
   Through their organizations, farmers and growers are relatively well 
integrated into the policy network, at least in its wider sense.  The trade 
association, the Fresh Produce Consortium, organizes key intermediaries 
(packers and wholesalers) between growers and supermarkets as well as 
involving importers and retailers.   However, farmers and growers are „policy 
takers‟ rather than „policy makers‟.  They have to operate within the 
constraints of a stringent regulatory framework and they also have to cope 
with the market power of the supermarkets which impose additional 
restrictions on their use of pesticides.  The link between the grower and the 
biopesticide producer is limited, with implications for product development 
and supporting the development of data for national product registration. The 
grower on the ground is largely separate from the regulatory process. There is 
a concern that involving them could compromise safety, but this highlights the 
lack of trust between all parties and the absence of effective policy and 
information exchange networks.  
 
 
 
31 
 
The Biopesticides Industry and the IBMA 
 
IBMA is the worldwide association of biocontrol industries. Created in 1995, 
it represents the views of biological control producers, mainly small 
companies with limited resources. There are only two firms in the UK 
industry that are sections of larger multinational groupings. IBMA has only 
part-time staff and consultants working for it, although some work has been 
undertaken on its behalf by independent wealthy individuals. Based in Paris, it 
at one time had the reputation of being a very French centric association. 
IBMA UK is a local organization of the international body and was formed in 
May 2003.    
        
PSD had to build up its relationship with IBMA in order to find a route 
into the industry. In Hay‟s terms (1998, 47), this represented a further stage in 
network formation with the network hegemon recruiting a further strategic 
partner to reinvigorate the network in the context of the development of the 
Biopesticides Scheme. As a senior CRD official put it, „[We] had to build up 
confidence, [we are] now much closer to IBMA, [we] had to break into them, 
[we went] out there telling them there is a plan, but they were reluctant to 
come and meet us.‟ Another official summed up, „it‟s a new relationship with 
the IBMA. They‟ve offered us visits round plants – formulation technology, 
unfamiliar techniques, opportunities to see it in a field‟. One practical 
indication of this new relationship is the joint working group of IBMA and 
CRD on efficacy issues, although IBMA is customarily represented in these 
meetings by consultants. One of these meetings was observed as part of the 
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research. It lasted for around two-and-a-half hours and a range of policy and 
technical issues were discussed in an open and constructive fashion. 
 
Despite undergoing organizational development, IBMA has been 
hampered by a lack of resources and the fact its technical knowledge is not 
always matched by a comparable level of political sophistication. As one 
consultant put it, „there is not good communication between the relevant 
parties‟.  An official within CRD added, „it is quite a disparate group with 
problems of communication. Consultants report back to the group, making it 
more manageable‟. IBMA has often had difficulty in acting in a proactive 
fashion and portraying itself as an authoritative spokesperson for the industry 
that can make effective decisions about its stance on issues sufficiently 
quickly. It has also not organized all potential registrants of biopesticides 
which is a challenge for CRD in their outreach efforts directed at the industry.  
Furthermore, previous experience with the regulatory system has, to some 
extent, undermined the confidence of product developers. Even when they do 
make contact they may be reluctant to provide relevant information, making it 
difficult for CRD to assist them.  For those firms that do make contact, our 
observations have shown how pre-submission meetings are a vital part of the 
process 
 
IBMA is a member of the Availability Action Plan Group, and CRD 
and other members of the network have been invited to IBMA meetings (such 
as one held in September 2005 where a senior figure within the organization 
stressed how helpful he had found the agency).  The REBECA programme, 
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funded by the European Commission, has also brought together relevant 
actors (e.g: IBMA and others) who might not otherwise have had contact, 
such as at a congress in Brussels in September 2007. The question is whether 
these contacts can be maintained, but it has been argued that the annual 
conference of the IBMA in Lucerne is emerging as a „one stop shop‟ for the 
policy network. 
 
Consultants 
 
Given the relative fragmentation of the policy network, it might seem that 
specialist consultants would be able to play an intermediary role in bringing 
actors together and using their technical expertise to devise policy solutions.   
It should be noted that many of these consultants are effectively one person 
businesses specialising in biopesticides and advising applicants on the 
approval process.   Other consultants provide growers with „hands on‟ 
technical advice on the use of biopesticides, but they are less integrated in the 
policy process.   To some extent, consultants do act as intermediaries. For 
example, they are prominent in IBMA and often form the IBMA delegations 
that interact with CRD, e.g., in the joint efficacy working group.   However, 
they are constrained by the fact that their function is primarily a commercial 
one.   There is also some ambivalence about them within the hub of the 
network, CRD.  One perception is that „We do consultants job for them‟ in the 
sense that consultants ring up and ask questions when they incorporate into 
advice that they sell to their clients.    There is concern that in certain 
instances they could convey the impression to some clients that access to the 
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regulatory system is more difficult than is in fact the case and this can produce 
some suspicion of their role.   On the other hand, there is also a realisation that 
„Some consultants can direct flak away from us.‟   To some extent, they are 
buffers for CRD, but they had no evident links with retailers and cannot 
compensate for deficiencies in the network as a whole.  
 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) 
 
Environmental NGO‟s tend to have a wider remit than pesticides, the 
exception being Pesticide Action Network (PAN). There is a lack of 
engagement by such groups in the biopesticides debate, reflecting indifference 
rather than hostility.  For its part IBMA has been slow to reach out to 
environmental groups as potential allies, which is perhaps surprising given 
that their members are producing more sustainable products than conventional 
pesticides.  Environmental groups have often been relatively isolated. The 
debate about a more sustainable agriculture is framed more around discourses 
about organic farming.  For example, the alternative to the extensive use of 
synthetic pesticides is often presented in terms of organics, or even genetically 
modified (GM) crops which remain politically controversial. Although they 
have generally been critical of pesticides and called for greater restrictions on 
their use, environmental groups have not been particularly supportive of 
biological alternatives. This may be in part because of a suspicion that they 
are „still pesticides‟ 
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According to their website, PAN „promotes healthy food, agriculture 
and an environment which will provide food and meet public health needs 
without dependence on toxic chemicals, and without harm to food producers 
and agricultural workers‟ (http://www.pan-uk.org/About/index.htm, accessed 
11/02/08).  A senior official within the organization accepted that food 
production without toxic pesticides would be more sustainable. However, they 
added that whilst „biopesticides are a possibility ... the reaction of the 
establishment to biopesticides is that it is a niche market ... Just because 
they‟re biopesticides doesn‟t mean they‟re safe‟.  NGO‟s such as Friends of 
the Earth and Greenpeace have not significantly engaged in the debate on 
biological alternatives, perhaps because they have largely left this area of 
policy to PAN.  In terms of the PSD‟s pilot scheme, Friends of the Earth were 
reported to be „not in favour of “fast-tracking” for bio-pesticides as they can 
still have an impact.‟ (ADAS Consulting, 2003, 36).   This is unfortunate 
given the good environmental characteristics of many biopesticide products 
and the contribution they could make to sustainability. It is important, 
however, to recognize involvement where it does exist, for example, PAN‟s 
membership of the Water, Diversity and Amateur Action Plan Groups. This, 
however, is interaction with the pesticides network in its wider sense.  
 
Retailers and Supermarkets  
 
Retailers often push for levels of pesticide reduction more rigorous than those 
required by regulators, which in themselves are very stringent. This is 
consistent with a body of work by Marsden and others that depicts retailers as 
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private interest governments that play a key role in food quality and safety 
issues. (Marsden et al 2000).   ‘The concept of choice editing – the idea that 
policymakers and businesses, especially retailers, can “edit out” the least 
sustainable products from appearing on shelves – is now well embedded in the 
debate around sustainable consumption and production.‟   (Food Ethics 
Council, 2008, 35).  One consequence is that in relation to pesticides 
supermarkets impose sustainability requirements on farmers and growers, who 
in turn require alternative crop protection tools.     
 
The research suggests a lack of connection, however, between large 
supermarkets and the rest of the policy network, in both its narrow and wider 
sense. This relative lack of contact represents a significant disjuncture in the 
network because the retailers are the point of contact with the final consumer 
and can influence their buying behaviour.  Because consumers are perceived 
to be concerned about pesticide residues, large supermarkets have developed 
what is in effect their own supplementary private system of regulation.   
Admittedly, it is not strictly a system of regulation in the sense that it does not 
involve the potential imposition of penalties in law, but the use of contractual 
relationships to affect the decisions of growers of fresh produce has a similar 
effect.  Although regulators had to be guarded about what they said, it was 
evident that there was some unease about supermarkets banning pesticides 
that had been judged to be safe by the approvals process. From the perspective 
of CRD, this supplementary regulatory system creates some difficulties as it 
implies that the state system is approving products that are not safe for use.  It 
is not surprising, therefore, that some reservations were expressed by CRD 
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staff about the role of the retailers. Expressing a personal view, one staff 
member commented, „[It] makes it difficult for us [retailers] giving the 
response that lots of pesticides are not safe....Retailers have [their] cake and 
eat it, they expect impossibly high standards from farmers who are forced into 
the situation of using them‟. For their part, some retailers expressed criticisms 
of CRD. A senior manager in a major retailer commented, „[There is] No sign 
of movement by PSD, [they] say we always do it that way, you‟ve got to do it 
that way....[In] all my dealings with PSD, what really frightens me is that they 
have no real life experience on the farm or of what the market is saying‟.                                                                                                                                                                            
        
CRD sources stated that links with retailers were relatively tenuous 
and this was confirmed by our interviews with large supermarket chains.  This 
is despite CRD „[trying to] have some engagement‟. „[We have] a dialogue 
with supermarkets but [it is] limited‟.  As one retailer put it, „apart from 
meetings I go to I have no other connection. [You] could say it‟s both ways 
[the lack of contact]‟.   There is thus a lack of effective engagement between 
the hub of the network, CRD, and a key set of commercial actors that are 
pursuing their own pesticide policies.  CRD as an organization bases its 
activities on the rigorous scientific appraisal of pesticide products. In contrast, 
the retailer system is driven by a desire to gain a competitive edge over other 
supermarkets by demonstrating that the products on their shelves are greener 
and safer. Therefore, the drivers for CRD and the retailers are different.  CRD 
have to use scientific expertise to implement a regulatory system created by 
statute whereas the central goal for the supermarkets is profit maximisation.  
As one retailer put it, the key question for them was „What effect does it have 
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on us commercially in terms of costs and yields?  [It‟s] always driven back to 
costs.   The market place we‟ve got is very competitive so you can‟t afford to 
be out of line commercially.‟     
 
Retailers do not usually actively promote biopesticides to their 
growers as a sustainable alternative to synthetic pesticides, arguing that they 
cannot promote particular commercial products.  Marks and Spencer and 
Sainsbury‟s are two exceptions; the latter held a conference in 2008 to discuss 
advances in the use of biopesticides with their suppliers. Retailers see 
themselves, moreover, as proxies for the consumer and consumer 
organizations are not particularly involved in discussion on biological 
alternatives. Again, consumers are generally information takers and not policy 
makers. One challenge is that they tend to have a clear if rather ill-informed 
image of organic produce, but relatively little understanding of the potential 
contribution of biocontrol agents to a more environmentally sustainable 
agriculture.  One retailer commented, „We don‟t meet [with environmental 
groups] enough, we want to get a bit further down the road‟. As stated above, 
however, environmental groups are not particularly engaging in the 
biopesticides debate.  
 
Conclusions    
 
We have argued that the biopesticides policy network is both incomplete and 
loosely integrated.  This results in an underperforming network, although not 
one that is completely dysfunctional.  As one may expect, a very loose and 
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incomplete network has little impact on observable policy outcomes.  It is 
clear from our research that the network has had limited influence on the 
formulation of policy. To the extent that policy has developed on 
biopesticides, it has been in large part due to (exogenous) pressure from the 
Cabinet Office; the authority resources of the state have been used to produce 
an outcome (Greaves, 2009). Even more importantly, however, the network 
has not facilitated policy delivery.  
 
To adapt Hay‟s question: underperformance for whom? Firstly, 
although some progress has been made, CRD still encounters difficulty in 
reaching out to biopesticides manufacturers and hence achieving the objective 
of registering more biopesticides to promote sustainability. IBMA is under-
resourced, lacks political sophistication, and does not organize all potential 
registrants of biopesticides. Moreover, the confidence of product developers 
has been undermined by previous experience of the regulatory system. 
Secondly, environmental groups have not been fully engaged in the debate, 
although in part this reflects a structuring of the discourse in terms of a 
polarisation between conventional and organic forms of farming. 
Environmental groups could do a great deal to promote biopesticides but they 
focus on being negative about synthetics rather than offering a positive 
alternative. It is disappointing how IBMA have not reached out to such 
groups.  Although they attempted to have a dialogue with the Soil Association 
(an environmental charity promoting sustainable, organic farming and 
championing human health), this was largely unsuccessful. Biopesticides that 
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display good environmental characteristics, therefore, are not being fully 
exploited.  
 
Thirdly, the sphere of consumption is insufficiently articulated in the 
network.  CRD have commented on the lack of systematic contact with 
retailers, claiming that they try and have a dialogue. However, there is some 
concern on their part about the role of retailers as „supplementary‟ regulators. 
The failure to integrate retailers reflects a broader tension between systems of 
state authority and market power when they exist alongside each other. 
Moreover, it leads to a creation of a supplementary private system of 
regulation in an attempt to meet consumer concerns about pesticides which 
might frustrate the achievement of preventive health objectives such as the 
„five a day‟ target.  The consumer may be reluctant to eat such fruit and 
vegetables due to a fear of pesticide residues.  However, this supplementary 
system of regulation does little to promote biopesticides as a safer alternative.  
Moreover, retailers have a considerable influence on growers and they could 
potentially do a great deal to encourage them to use biological alternatives. If 
retailers were to promote biopesticides, it would produce a real impetus to 
produce more products.  One could also visualize a retailer-environmental 
group alliance to promote biologicals (in the same sense as Bluesky, an 
American retailer of environmentally friendly building materials and products 
for homes. http://blueskywindandsolar.com).   
 
As it is, retailers are undermining confidence in the state regulatory 
system. An important reason why the network underperforms is the inability 
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to enrol market actors‟ such as consumers and supermarkets. One point about 
policy community insulation is that it is effective for the insiders when they 
can control formulation and implementation. In this case supermarkets would 
help promote the successful delivery of policy but they are not part of the 
relevant policy network.  Therefore, a private/market governing regime 
operates separately from a policy-bargaining regime and this is a broader 
challenge for governing in market-liberal systems. Supermarket „schemes‟ 
and „codes‟ may have profound implications on how consumers act with 
knock on effects for public goods such as environmental quality and 
biodiversity etc. 
vi
  However, these are necessarily driven by commercial 
considerations and are less likely to achieve public purposes than systems of 
state regulation. There is the added question as to whether retailers are 
adequate proxies for consumers, even given the information about consumer 
preferences that they collect as part of their commercial operations. Moreover, 
if consumers held favourable views on biopesticides, retailers may have 
responded more positively 
vii
  Therefore, public opinion (or the lack of it) is a 
factor in the network being incomplete (this incidentally puts a new twist on 
Jordan and Maloney‟s [1997, 558] view that „low public profile [visibility] of 
decisions‟ and „low political attention level‟ favours the formation of closed 
policy communities).   
 
The nature of the biopesticides network constrains the actions of its 
agents. As suggested by Marsh‟s dialectical model, there are also feedback 
effects from policy. In particular, government attempts to encourage 
biopesticides have led to some improvement in integration within the network,  
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in turn leading to improved outcomes in terms of rates of registration. There is 
a sense in which central government intervention, or exogenous pressure, 
helped to create the network, or at least galvanized it, around the regulatory 
agency.  Marsh and Rhodes (1992b, 257) point to the importance of 
exogenous forces in driving through „network change‟ and network formation. 
Broadly speaking central government intervention is a form of what they call 
„institutional pressure‟ (1992b, 257). Our study shows how even under 
governance arrangements were agencies have a large degree of autonomy, 
networks can be promoted by (external) central government departments. 
 
Our analysis highlights that not all networks work as effectively as 
they could.  Moreover, we introduced the notion of „incomplete networks‟ 
(which we distinguished from issue networks) and showed how they can 
result in network underperformance.  This can be a particular problem when 
retailers are excluded from policy making and implementation. It is important 
to remind the more enthusiastic governance theorists that network governance 
does not always work as intended. This supports Parker‟s (2007) argument 
that networks need density and breadth, as opposed to writers such as Smith 
(1993) that policy communities increase the capabilities of the state to make 
and implement policy.  As stated at the outset, not all networks fit the policy 
community/policy network typologies as suggested by the literature.  Our 
study has identified a loosely integrated network but with a relatively small 
number of actors and not always easily accessible to external stakeholders.   
In short, it is relatively easy to enter the network, but it is not completely 
open.  The question is not simply who wants to come in but to what extent 
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they are invited by existing members of the network, a situation applying to 
both retailers and environmental groups. Indeed, membership of the Pesticides 
Forum is by invitation only (that being said, if the network is to function at all 
there has to be some boundary management).  
 
CRD have been keen to engage in dialogue but there is some concern 
on their part, particularly about the role of retailers. We need also consider 
whether outsiders would choose (or are able) to join such a network, even if 
invited to do so.  The „organic‟ discourse of environmental groups, and the 
„profit driven supplementary regulator‟ agenda of supermarkets limits their 
ability (or wish) to reach out to the regulatory agency and other actors 
associated with biopesticides.  In short, a loose network can remain 
incomplete, with „discourses‟ and „agendas‟ in control as much as a wish for 
resources by a state department or agency.  To put in another way, the desire 
for (and feasibility of) dialogue must work both ways. These vertical links are 
often underplayed in the literature, with its focus on government reaching out 
to external stakeholders. To conclude, our analysis of loose and incomplete 
networks, network underperformance and network failure brings some new 
thinking to the policy network paradigm.  In the words of Daugbjerg (1998, 
191): „Policy Network analysis is a fruitful approach. Although its emphasis 
has been on description, this should not lead one to conclude that it has no 
potential for providing explanation‟  
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NOTES 
                                                 
i
  The authors would like to thank Carsten Daugbjerg and Darren Halpin for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts and also the Rural Economy and Land Use programme (RELU) 
for funding their research on the role of regulation in promoting biological alternatives to 
chemical pesticides.  
ii
 A Google search (27/03/09) brings up references to a pesticides sector. See, for example, 
http://www.pan-uk.org/Images/oldstyle/books/pestsapp.htm, accessed 27/03/09).  
iii
 This was held at Warwick HRI – more information at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/biopesticides/events   
iv
 REBECA stands for the „Regulation of Environmental Biological Control Agents‟.  
v
 REACH stands for the „Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical 
Substances‟ 
vi
 EG: the various assurance schemes such as Nature‟s Choice from Tesco. The standard was 
developed to ensure that produce comes from growers who use good agricultural practices, 
operate in an environmentally responsible way and with proper regard for the health and well 
being of their staff.  It was first introduced in 1991 to control chemical usage and develop 
environmentally sustainable production standards for Tesco‟s growers (see 
http://www.tescofarming.com/tnc.asp).  
vii
 The public may be concerned about pesticide residues but they are not well informed about 
biological alternatives (and may be put off by the term biopesticides). Further research would 
be useful on public opinion  perhaps through the use of focus groups and citizen‟s juries.  
